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Project Summary  
This study was undertaken to assist Commander Logistics Force Western Pacific in understanding 
vulnerabilities in a supply chain that includes United States Naval Ship (USNS) ships, United States Navy 
(USN) ships, operating companies, civilian military unions, and a large contracting footprint in order to 
minimize operational risk to mission and optimize logistics resources and operations, while maintaining 
command and control (C2) of operational forces. The study included Red Teaming of current practices, 
distributed logistics, and optimized routing; supply chain management and the impact of reliability, 
availability, and maintainability on readiness; and social network analysis of the maritime logistics 
network in Western Pacific (WestPac) and a social media vulnerability assessment. An assessment was 
made of logistics risks associated with surge/peak demand at a single facility, and a prototype module was 
developed, as a proof-of-concept. This tool can be used to perform what-if analysis, in the evaluation of 
policy changes related to technology purchases, pre-positioning plans, or outsourcing decisions. The 
research constructed a discrete-time optimization model and used this model to analyze a variety of finite-
duration operational scenarios. The model was also used to perform sensitivity analysis on various 
parameters of ship design, including amount of storage space for palletized cargo and the breakdown of 
the liquid capacity need for each type of fuel (JP5 and DFM). Sociograms were produced to depict the 
maritime logistics network and a separate assessment of social media vulnerabilities was provided. An 
interactive tool was developed to allow Task Force 73/Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific 
(CTF-73) to further analyze aspects of the logistics network to include ships, ports, and loitering areas. 
 
Keywords: distributed logistics, optimized routing, supply chain management, reliability, availability, 
maintainability, vulnerability assessment, logistics risks, pre-positioning plans, discrete-time optimization 
model, sensitivity analysis, maritime logistics network, social media vulnerabilities, interactive tool 
 
Background 
The U.S. Navy’s at sea replenishment system is a mobile supply line designed to support the deployed 
Carrier Task Force (CTF)/Cruiser/Destroyer (CRUDES) Surface Action Group (SAG) and forward 
deployed units while at sea. In the 7th Fleet area of responsibility the main component of the mobile 
supply line, the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ship, has become a possible target with the development of 
the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). With the ability to target and disable a CLF with an ASBM, an 
enemy can now disable a deployed CTF/CRUDES fleet by eliminating its required replenished resources, 
rendering it combat ineffective and more vulnerable to attack. With the goal of preserving the CLF’s 
capabilities to perform its mission while not subjecting it to an ASBM threat, we consider the possibility of 
utilizing a “mini-CLF” to shuttle fuel and other commodities between CLFs operating in a safe 
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environment and warships operating in a threat zone. Metrics to assess logistics risks are a pillar of supply 
chain surety: the assessment of risk to assure performance, not merely control and mitigate points of 
failure. Logistics risks are multi-faceted and interdependent; all relevant facets of logistics risk must be 
measured, or one might unintentionally increase one risk while mitigating another. Logistics risk includes 
readiness risk (risk to operational availability), as well as capacity risk, supply risk, schedule risk, and 
budget risk; all these risks are interdependent.  The application of social network analysis and open source 
data base integration for the identification, mapping and tracking of vessels, owners/operators, facilities, 
activities and cargoes has been successfully employed by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in a 
previous Navy-funded research project. A unique aspect of this research, is that social network matrices 
can be dynamically updated by open-source data bases to provide real-time awareness and tracking for 
operational purposes. Further, extensive social media exploitation research has been done in the NPS 
Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab to better understand areas of potential 
operational security (OPSEC) vulnerability, and interactive tools were developed and tailored for the 
sponsor. 
 
Findings and Conclusions  
 
Operations Research 
We obtain a number of insights from our four scenarios that considered three strategic situations: 
Peacetime, Rising Tensions, and Wartime. The first two scenarios demonstrate an important aspect of the 
rolling horizon optimization framework. Although we have more resources available in the second 
scenario, theoretically allowing better solutions, we observe that decisions made in early iterations of the 
rolling horizon sequence can result in inferior solutions in subsequent iterations. This important 
phenomenon should not go unnoticed by practitioners considering a rolling horizon approach.  
 
We also note that in a rolling horizon framework, it is important to choose a long enough planning 
horizon to model any decisions we would like the model to be capable of making. With this in mind, and 
given that it would take a CLF ship up to 56 time periods to move from an Aft RAS Lane (ARL) to Guam 
and back, we extend the planning horizon from 60 time periods to 90 time periods in the third excursion. 
Although a 60-period horizon would have allowed the movement to take place, the model would not have 
seen any benefit from making this decision. We also change the shuttle and CLF starting inventories to 
reflect them having been operating at sea for some time. After making these changes we examine Scenario 
3. From these results we observe that a primary limitation is the number of fleet replenishment ships (T-
AOs) in the scenario. Prior to the last 30 time periods, the warships’ Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) 
inventories only fall below the safety level for a few time periods and by a small amount (1-2%). Had a 
second T-AO arrived between time periods 47 and 90, the shuttles would have been able to maintain the 
warships’ DFM inventory levels. These results also show that the dry cargo/ammunition ship (T-AKE) is 
ill-suited for supporting this type of operation. The T-AKE has large quantities of stores and ammunition 
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but smaller quantities of DFM and JP5. A fast combat support ship (T-AOE) could be a better support 
vessel for this type of operation as it brings comparable quantities of stores and ammunition as the T-
AKE, but an additional 71,000 barrels (bbls) of DFM and 61,000 bbls of JP5 (CNO, 2007). 
 
It is also interesting to compare our first and fourth scenarios. Both involve a Rising Tensions strategic 
situation, but the fourth involves more shuttles traveling at faster speeds, and it uses a longer planning 
horizon as well as an 80% starting inventory (vice 100% for the first scenario). Interestingly, in the fourth 
scenario, the warships spend more time below the safety level for DFM and jet engine grade fuel (JP5). We 
speculate that this is due in part to the combination of a lower starting inventory and more shuttle ships. 
Ostensibly, more shuttles should result in better performance. But it is important to remember that while 
shuttles are delivering fuel, they are also burning it. When we reduce the starting inventory of the shuttles 
and CLF ships from 100% to 80% and increase the number of shuttles from four to six, we reduce the 
starting amount of deliverable DFM from 195,000 bbls to 191,200 bbls and the starting amount of 
deliverable JP5 from 100,400 bbls to 81,680 bbls. At the same time, we increase the usage rate of the 
system by 320 bbls of DFM per time period and 3.40 bbls of JP5 per time period. This decrease in starting 
inventory levels and increase in usage per time period reduces the effectiveness of the system, and this 
reduction is not completely mitigated by the increase in speed and number of shuttles.  
 
We confirm that Dual Lane Replenishment at Sea model (MC-DL-RASM) produces reasonable results in 
the four scenarios we examined, and that the “mini-CLF” concept of operations is a viable alternative to 
the traditional CLF concept. We observe that the rolling horizon approach works best with a planning 
horizon of at least 79 time periods due to the length of time it would take a CLF ship to make the trip from 
ARL 3 to Guam and back to ARL 3 (54 time periods), then fill up a shuttle (2 time periods), and have it 
transit to forward RAS lane (FRL) 7 (22 time periods) and resupply a warship (1 time period per warship). 
In fact, even this horizon is a bit optimistic when we take into account the fact that RAS events can only 
occur during daylight time periods. We also observe that in each scenario, the shuttles will RAS with the 
CLF ships if possible rather than using a port to resupply. This could be an indication that having a port 
available in the area of responsibility (AOR) is not as important to maintaining the warships on station as 
having a constant supply of CLF ships. 
 
Combat Logistics 
This paper has reviewed several risk metrics and made recommendations. Quantile risk metrics such as 
value at risk (VaR) have been recommended as a way to track and control logistics risk. Conditional value 
at risk (CVaR) has been recommended as a way to assess the value of surety investments. Commonly used 
metrics such as standard deviation, coefficient of variation (CoV) and ordinal (color coded) risk metrics 
have been shown to have significant shortcomings. Reference has been made to ways of estimating risk 
from data, and calibrating the subjective estimates of subject matter experts, and using Bayesian Updating 
to improve such estimates as data become available. Military Sealift Command (MCS) has been presented 
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as a way to build predictive risk models that can tie logistics processes and expenditures to mission 
outcomes. Some of these metrics have been demonstrated on the 688 Class Submarine Dry-docking 
Selected Restricted Availability 
(DSRA) process on a small dataset, and recommendations were made on which sub-processes might be 
explored, and what additional data might be required to reduce schedule and budget risk, and improve its 
prediction. Those results are not included in this summary because they are unclassified For Official Use 
Only (FOUO), but they have been delivered to the sponsor. 
 
Risk management is a complex topic, complicated by with varying degrees of risk acceptance. This is 
regrettable because the subsequent (over) reaction may make it more difficult to promulgate some very 
useful tools. The useful tools for risk management are not new at all, though refinements continue to be 
made in risk management, as in every field. What is new is the attention being devoted to risk, caused by 
e.g., the financial crisis of 2007-2009, and the more recent wave of institutionalized, and “weaponized” 
cyber-crime that has exposed network vulnerabilities.  Unfortunately, great attention (and large amounts 
of money being spent) causes a need for action that sometimes outstrips expertise, or even common sense. 
What is new and useful (at least in some organizations) is the availability of large amounts of data with a 
relatively high integrity, which can be used in risk management applications. However, some risk 
management, in the Department of Defense (DoD) and elsewhere, continues to be done with 
inappropriate tools, and with little or no relevant data. 
 
It is important to measure risk appropriately in order to verifiably reduce that risk through training, and 
other investments in reliability. Where it cannot be reduced, risk must be quantified so that an acceptable 
level of risk can be buffered against in a cost-effective way, via safety stocks and surge capacity. When 
buffers are exceeded, risk must be quantified so that contingency plans can be resourced to restore normal 
operations as soon as possible. Buffers and contingency plans for logistics surety require scarce funds that 
can be used for other priorities across the enterprise.   
 
So, finally, logistics risk must be tied to readiness and mission risk, to facilitate an appropriate allocation 
of funds among activities that compete to provide mission capacity.   
 
In the consideration of future major war scenarios, the salience of budgets for readiness reaches new levels 
of importance. In the Civil War, the First World War, and World War II, the United States was willing to 
shoulder a mountain of debt to meet wartime challenges. Now, the U.S. is already shouldering a mountain 
of debt, without a major war. Inexorably over time, more debt means more expensive debt. If we enter a 
major war with this level of debt, even if we win, a doubling of our current level of debt may cause 
permanent damage to our status as a world power. 
 
Defense Analysis/CORE Lab 
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Maritime Network Analysis:  The behavior for ships from both the Maritime Sealift Command and the 
Maritime Security Program Fleet (MSP) were analyzed in order to identify patterns in the shipping 
logistics network. These patterns of shipping behavior could indicate how centralized (or decentralized) 
the shipping logistics network is as a whole and which locations in the United States Indo-Pacific 
Command (USINDOPACOM) AOR are most important to the logistics network. This report analyzes the 
USINDOPACOM shipping logistics network to help identify which areas are central to the network as a 
whole, and which subsets of ships (in their associated operations areas (OPAREAs)) are central to 
different portions of the network. 
 
What becomes clear from this analysis is that there is a high degree of predictability associated with the 
CTF-73 logistics network as a result of overdependence on the primary ports of transshipment. This 
creates vulnerabilities to disruption during times of crisis or conflict. By distributing transshipment ports 
more widely among partner or friendly nations, there would be a greater likelihood of 
survivability/sustainability of the logistics network as a whole.   
 
Social Media Exploitation:  An initial edge list (a matrix of social media nodes) was gathered by looking 
for accounts on Twitter that mentioned ships of interest in their tweets within the last year. This search 
yielded a total of 386 Twitter account handles of interest. This initial list of accounts was used as a 
springboard for exploring the online network. In an effort to identify the important accounts from this 
directed (connections that are unidirectional) network, we ran hub (highly connected nodes) and 
authority (key repositories of specialized information to which hubs are pointing) score algorithms. 
 
The key take-away in terms of social media vulnerability, is that nodes with high hub and authority scores 
are most vulnerable to exploitation as sources of information regarding the CTF-73 logistics network.  t 
would be useful for official Navy sites to monitor the type of information that is being publicly shared and 
those sites that routinely follow these accounts. Further, local media reporting of CTF-73 activities should 
also be routinely monitored and assessed. 
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Future research could consider heuristic approaches to planning, as an alternative to integer 
programming. We have given examples of how logistics risk can be tied to readiness risk and mission risk 
through simulation. Given the budget constraints we face, we recommend that further research explore 
simulation models, to assist in the proper allocation of scarce budgets to those logistics processes that 
contribute most to the reduction is readiness risk and mission risk. Future research might also want to 
apply the maritime network analysis tools we have developed and tie this analysis to optimization and risk 
models we have discussed. Social media exploitation research might also delve more deeply into a variety 
of social media sources to further identify potential OPSEC vulnerabilities within the logistics network. 
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AOR – area of responsibility 
ARL – aft RAS lane  
ASBM – anti-ship ballistic missile 
bbls – barrels 
C2 – command and control 
CLF – Combat Logistics Force 
CORE Lab – Common Operational Research Environment Lab 
CoV – coefficient of variation 
CRUDES – Cruiser/Destroyer 
CTF-73 - Task Force 73/Commander, Logistics Group Western Pacific 
CTF- Combined Task Force, Carrier Task Force  
CVaR – conditional value at risk 
DoD – Department of Defense 
FOUO - For Official Use Only  
FRL – forward RAS lane 
DFM – Diesel Fuel Marine 
DSRA – Dry-docking Selected Restricted Availability 
USINDOPACOM - United States Indo-Pacific Command 
JP-5 – jet engine grade fuel  
MC-DL-RASM - Dual Lane Replenishment at Sea model 
MSC – Military Sealift Command 
MSP – Maritime Security Program 
NPS – Naval Postgraduate School 
OPAREAS - operations areas  
OPSEC – operational security  
RAS – replenishment at sea 
SAG - surface action group 
T-AKE – dry cargo/ammunition ship 
T-AO -  fleet replenishment ship 
T-AOE – fast combat support ship 
USN – United States Navy 
USNS - United States Naval Ship   
VaR – value at risk 
WESTPAC – Western Pacific  
 
 
